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Abstract 
States fragility, failure and collapse are the results of both domestic and external determinant factors. This article 
provides a critique of the debates of failing states, failed states, and collapsed states in Africa by examining three 
cases: DRC, Burundi, and Somalia. It tries to highlight the impacts of external interventions on functionality, 
viability and sovereignty of African states. It presents the various interventions and their impacts on state 
viability in Africa. It argued that by taking similar paths of intervention with the same logic of the past, it is 
difficult to solve problems related to state failures in Africa. Instead, there has to be a different path of the state-
building process that takes into account Africa’s realities and the interest of the majority, not the interests of the 
elites and the donors. Besides, instead of focusing on the idea of the liberal peace theory of republicanism, 
cosmopolitanism, and a free-market economy, it is better to address state-society relations in Africa. Hence, 
Africa should import those devices and institutions that advance its interests. Moreover, it should be clear that 
the problems and their impacts are trans-boundary that need transnational cooperative and integrative responses. 
The rebuilding of a failed state and preventing sates from failure through both curative and preventive 
approaches have to be the concerns of the 21st-century global governance, peace, and security narratives.  
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1. Introduction 
A state is considered as a sovereign if it has sovereign control over a given territory, holds a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of coercive physical force within its borders, mobilizes masses for requests of the state, collects 
taxes, and protects lives, properties, and freedoms of its nationals from internal and external threat (Cem, 2009). 
It is related to Machiavelli’s and Max Weber’s understanding of the state. It is a political and legal institution 
with the ultimate source of law for itself and has proper territorial and governmental legitimacy. 
Failed or collapsed states contrasted with the ideal of the Westphalian state systems that exercise full 
sovereign powers over territory and population, has a functioning government that monopolizes legitimate 
violence and provides public goods, and can make and keep international obligations (Yoo, 2011).  When this 
monopoly on the use of coercive force eroded, it begins to lose its control over its people and territory; and its 
ability to collect taxes and render the services (Cem, 2009; Eriksen, 2011). According to 
Machiavellian/Weberian understanding, state failure occurs when the national government loses the monopoly of 
the means of violence. 
The term “failing,”  “failed,” or “collapsed” is unsettled, but they have been used to portray cases of severe 
political crises in specific countries like Burundi, DR Congo, and Somalia.  Most scholars agree that they have 
some common attributes like loss of physical control over territory and people, lack of a monopoly on the use of 
force, declining legitimacy, an inability to provide services to its people, and a lack of capacity to implement 
policies or promote economic development and run international obligations (Usman, and Hany, 2007). 
 
2. Conceptual Debates  
The debates on state failure and collapse gathered momentum and have become part of the global governance 
and security discourse since the early-1990s (Usman, and Hany, 2007). Compared to the earlier periods, the state 
breakdown that emerged during the 1990s became more rampant and destructive with human, national, and 
international security implications and strategic concerns (Yumlu, 2012; Fukuyama, 2005; Baker, 2007). The 
end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks are two important episodes held as responsible for 
the recent recognition and interest in matters relating to state weakness (Olowu, and Paulos, 2016). Since 
September 9/11, the discourse of securitization shifted from a “big power” lens to a “small power” lens (Baker, 
2007). Despite the existential security and governance threat debate, there is an argument in the literature that 
rejects the idea of failed states as a politicized, ethnocentric, hegemonic concept with interventionist 
connotations (Newman, 2009; Ashraf and Clare, 2008).  Hence, the sharing of the disease debate is problematic.  
There is a glaring gap between the de-jure sovereignty that the international system affords such states and 
their de-facto capabilities to serve their populations and act as responsible members of the international 
community. The failed state debate emerged as a result of the apparent discrepancy between negative (nominal) 
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and positive (real) sovereignty- the sovereignty game (Newman, 2009).  Collapsed, failed, and fragile are range 
of concepts that have emerged to describe states that do not live up to the Weberian expectations of what states 
should deliver and how states should work (Olowu, and Paulos, 2016). They indicated post-Westphalian world 
where notions of inviolable and equal state sovereignty and autonomy eroded; where there are both state and non 
state actors; where insecurity and conflict is primarily characterized by civil war, insurgency and state failure; 
and where solidarity norms and responses related to governance and human rights are transcending absolute 
norms of sovereignty and non-interference (Newman, 2009). 
The functional abnormality of the state could be understood as a process in which the state fails to discharge 
its responsibility due to a steadily declining of capacity. Based on their performance states are classified as 
strong, weak, failing, failed or collapsed (Eriksen, 2011). Gross also identified five types of dysfunctional states: 
anarchic states without central government like Somalia; phantom or mirage states with semblance authority like 
DRC; anaemic sates weakened by insurgent groups; captured sates dominated by elites; and aborted states which 
failed before they were ever consolidated (Jean-Germaine, 1996). Some understand them as “disrupted states” to 
refer to states that are unconsolidated at the periphery and are often in an ongoing state of entropy (Usman and 
Hany, 2007). Some still see them as a low-income country in which economic policies, institutions and 
governance are so poor that development is highly unlikely (Usman and Hany, 2007).  
 
2.1. Fragile States   
State fragility is difficult to define partly because the term itself is fluid and partly because it represents a 
continuum, with the possibility of a state moving in and out of fragility, depending on its ability to respond to 
internal and external shocks (Ncube, and Basil 2013). Fragility is essentially a dynamic process where states may 
not always display signs and elements of fragility; may be more obvious at some times than at others. 
Development partners have tried to categorize fragile countries using different performance indicators or indexes.  
Fragility refers to the inability to deliver basic services  to their nationals in a complete manner either 
because of weak capacity, weak institutions and poor policies, political instability, lack of will or a combination 
of all these factors (Usman and Hany, 2007; Ncube, and Basil 2013). They do not have a legitimate monopoly on 
the use of force, and a country’s territories is not completely controlled by the central government and have little 
ability to provide services (Cem, 2009; Tusalem, 2016). Furthermore, fragility is a matter of degree - ranging 
from states that have ceased to have capability and function but name and cannot provide security or welfare to 
anyone, to certain states that can deliver basic services to most of their citizens (Cem, 2009; Tusalem, 2016). 
In some cases a state may possess some of the features of statehood, but not in others. It may have a 
monopoly over the means of violence, but unable to provide infrastructure, or maintain the rule of law or it may 
have a functioning military, but an inefficient bureaucracy (Eriksen, 2011). They are characterized by various 
aspects of state deficits in terms of political commitment, willingness, legitimacy and stability; institutional, 
technical and administrative capacity; functional authority; economic performance; good governance; human 
security, prudent financial management; state structures; peace and provision of public goods (Olowu, and 
Paulos, 2016). 
The foremost signs of state fragility are lack of willingness and capacity or state ineffectiveness and 
political violence. The former related with enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and 
raising revenues and the latter refers to the existence of repression or civil conflict. The general essence of 
fragility is that states are not performing all responsibilities in equal footing and effectiveness. They perform 
well in some areas and fail in others. Fragility is when there is a partial provision of core functions of the state. 
Hence, a state is fragile if state institutions cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its 
nationals in uniform and constant manner. 
 
2.2. Failed States   
Despite there is no agreement on the definition of state failure, generally, they are unable to carry out their 
purpose of existence (Jean-Germaine, 1996). Some define a failed state as has no effective control over its 
territory; unable to uphold its monopoly of violence; and lack of legitimacy and efficiency (Cem, 2009; Tusalem, 
2016; Eriksen, 2011; Rotberg, 2004). Zartman (1995) also developed the idea of state failure along the lines of 
Hobbesian social contract theory that focuses on the relationship between the state and citizen. For Zartman, 
state failure occurs when they are unable to perform their respective functions.  According to Rotberg (2002: 85), 
“nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. Their governments 
lose legitimacy, and in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes 
illegitimate”. 
A failed state is a state that can no longer perform its basic security, peace, governance, and development 
functions. According to Rotberg (2003:5), “Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested 
bitterly by warring factions.”  Failed states lose their control of territory and people due to political and criminal 
violence, two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, not able to achieve economic growth or 
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development, massive economic inequities, and violent competition for resources (Rotberg, 2003). Here it is a 
state in name only where its government is unable to maintain public services, institutions, or authority and that 
central control over territory does not exist but de jure (Newman, 2009). The civil wars that characterize failed 
states usually have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal enmities (Rotberg, 2004). 
In such states, democratic debate is noticeably absent, and legitimacy is in doubt. Only the institution of the 
executive functions and the legislature, bureaucracy, judiciary, and the military have lost their sense of 
professional responsibility and exist solely to carry out the orders of the executive and to oppress citizens and are 
often highly politicized institutions (Rotberg, 2004). According to Potter (2004), indicators such as the 
restrictions on the free flow of information, the subjugation of women, the inability to accept responsibility for 
individual or collective failure, the extended family or clan as the basic unit of social organization, the 
domination by a restrictive religion, the low valuation of education, and the low prestige assigned to work are 
main attributes of such states (cited in Orman, 2016). 
Corruption flourishes on a destructive scale, inflation and smuggling become rife, and terror can breed 
along with the prevailing anarchy that undermines real national and per capita levels of annual GDP (Rotberg, 
2004). Physical infrastructure decays and living standards decline rapidly, lose legitimacy among their citizens, 
and suffer internal armed conflict, often rooted in longstanding ethnic, religious, or regional rivalries (Yoo, 
2011). In failed states, non-state actors control resources and population; the government cannot monopolize 
legitimate violence or provide public goods, and the economy has usually collapsed, producing famine, refugee 
flows, and human rights disasters (Yoo, 2011). 
Other symptoms of state failure include the erosion of authority to make collective decisions, and inability 
to provide reasonable public services, and the loss of capacity to interact informal relations with other states, 
revolutionary wars, genocides, and politicides, and adverse or disruptive regime transitions (Iqbal, and Harvey, 
2008). The Fund for Peace (2006) uses a list of 12 indicators to evaluate state stability; these indicators include 
demographic pressures, refugees and displaced persons, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, 
economic decline, the delegitimization of state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized 
elites, and external intervention (Iqbal, and Harvey, 2008). 
Fragile states lack regime legitimacy, the capacity to respond to service delivery, territorial presence and 
control, and responsibility.  Security and social amenities are felt, at best, in the capital city, leaving the large 
part of the country unprotected and ungoverned. Lack of control over the army, coupled with the influx of small 
arms makes a state less able to contain uprisings. No sound economic policies existed, leadership was 
authoritarian and patrimonial, and democratic space was dwindling, opposition parties targeted, the media 
gagged, and politics of exclusion practiced (Ncube, and Basil 2013). Economic mismanagement, inept economic 
policies, weak governance,  low levels of economic development, and weak economic basis,  historical patterns 
of exclusive economic growth (Ncube, and Basil 2013). 
State failure is different from a weak state where the latter is about the diminishing performance, while the 
former is about the malfunction of one or more of the state functions.  State failure is relational and relative that 
refers to a state’s performance relative to others (Usman and Hany, 2007).  Most failed states are in Africa, in 
particular post-conflict states, such as Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Sudan (Tusalem, 2016).  A failed state is different from collapsed states in the sense that a failed state has a 
minimal bureaucracy that imperfectly delivers public goods; provide security and mediate conflicts on an ad hoc 
or informal basis, and partial delivery of social services (Heilbrunn, 2006).  In a collapsed state, however, 
citizens have no channels to mediate conflicts, public services are unavailable, and in the worst cases, they are 
subject to random violence, warlords and militia contest, and administrative, economic, political, and social 
organizations fragment into smaller units (Heilbrunn, 2006). A failed state collapses when its bureaucracy ceases 
to function, public services are unavailable, and violence becomes commonplace. 
 
2.3. Collapsed States  
State collapse is not a onetime incident but rather a long term poor performance of the state. According to 
Zartman(1996:pp)  a state has collapsed ‘when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed’.  These 
states are characterized by lack of functioninal state institutions; breakdown of governmental and societal 
structures; breakdown of good governance, law and order; lose of power, legitimacy, symbol of identity and 
societal cohesion and can no longer assure security (Usman and Hany, 2007; Zartman, 1996;Eriksen, 2011). 
It refers to central state institutions and authorities that ceased to function. It is a rare and extreme version of 
the failed state where political goods obtained through private or ad hoc means- Somalia being the only clear 
case of it (Rotberg, 2004). A collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority, a mere geographical expression, a 
black hole into which a failed polity has fallen, and there is no state but a stateless society (Ibid.2004). Here the 
rule of the strong is common (Rotberg, 2003). In such contexts, states have no significant capacities to perform 
their core services to its inhabitants. In general, the terms describe a situation in which a central government has 
either lost presence in a significant portion of real estate (territorial collapse) or has lost the capacity to rule a 
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territory in which it has a physical presence, or both (Menkhaus, 2003). A collapsed state refers to a situation in 
which the structure, authority, law, and political order have disintegrated and where its institutions can no longer 
exercise authority over its political and economic territory (Solomon, and Cornelia, 2004).  
Generally, there are three basic approaches to conceptualize state failing, failure, and collapse: the political 
and legal; the historical and developmental; and the sociological perspectives (Thürer, 1999). Failed States are 
essentially associated with internal and endogenous problems and featured by the internal collapse of law and 
order; the absence of bodies capable of representing the State at the international level and being independent of 
the influences of the outside world. In accordance with a political and legal perspective, Rogue States, Weak 
States, Non-States, Phantom/Mirage States, Anemic States, Captured States, and the Aborted States have 
referred to either legal or political weaknesses which have cross-border negative effects upon the international 
system. 
The historical and developmental perspective claims that existing failed States have been affected by three 
geopolitical factors: during and after the Cold War, where the two superpowers supported regimes in power and 
denying it at the end; the heritage of colonial states and regimes formation which destroy traditional political and 
social structures; general processes of modernization which encouraged social and geographical mobility but 
were not counterbalanced by nation-building processes capable of placing the State on a firm foundation 
(Thürer,1999).   
According to the sociological perspective, the problem of the failed state is characterized by two contexts. 
The first is the collapse of the central government that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory'.  In such monopole States, the police, judiciary, and other bodies serving to 
maintain law and order have either ceased to exist or are no longer able to operate. The second is the brutality 
and intensity of the violence used.  Finally, the Monopole States and the Anarchic States are considered in the 
Sociological Approach as they stress the collapse of the core government in the context of the Weberian 
definition of statehood (Thürer, 1999). In a nutshell, state fragility is about the variation in performance, state 
failure is about the inability to deliver what is expected from state or the existence of a nominal state, and state 
collapse is the absence of the state with its institutions or the existence of stateless societies. 
 
3. The Debate on the Causes of State Failure or Collapse 
There is no general agreement among scholars as to which principal factors that lead to state breakdown: 
economic, or political, or social factors (Heilbrunn, 2006). Most analysts accept the multi-causal, 
multidimensional, and mutually reinforcing nature of the drivers of failure, and place different importance on 
certain causal factors (Ncube, and Basil 2013). The factors that contribute to states' collapse are both inside-out 
and outside-in processes involved both internal and external factors (Yumlu, 2012). Failing states are the results 
of a legacy of unresolved historical inequities, including colonial rule, the role of the superpowers during the 
Cold War, the role of international financial institutions in a structural adjustment program, poverty, corrupt 
elites, xenophobia, parochial political culture (Baker, 2007). 
There are agential, structural, and synthetic casual explanations of state failure (Townshend, 2007). The 
agential causes attributed to the actions of individuals and groups in terms of greed and fear, poor and oppressive 
leadership, corruption, neopatrimonialism and clientelism, predation, and warlord politics. While, the structural 
components depict underdeveloped economic, social, and political structures; bad political culture; poor state-
society relations; arbitrary borders; underdeveloped governance institutions; systemic exclusion from global 
capitalism as the causes of state failure. The synthetic approach tries to merge both the agent and structural 
casual factors for state collapse (Townshend, 2007). 
The major primary drivers of conflict and fragility in Africa include lack of good governance; economic 
and social exclusion; economic collapse and worsening poverty; state weakness and collapse; religious 
extremism; and ideological exclusion (Ncube, and Basil 2013).  Natural resource curse; the proliferation of small 
arms and light weapons; superpower rivalry; youth bulge, and demographic stresses are also secondary drivers 
for state breakdown in Africa. Tertiary drivers are related to the neighborhood, regional, and international 
Effects (Ncube, and Basil 2013). 
Global factors such as slave trade, colonialism, cold-war, structural adjustment programs, international 
trade, migration flows, economic interdependencies, and global economic shifts all have impacted the viability 
of states. The legacies of colonialism were also critical to understand state failure discourse. Colonial 
administrations left deeply flawed states by selectively including some groups while excluding others from the 
political arena (Heilbrunn, 2006). Africa's post-independence rulers inherited artificial states that are created by 
European colonial powers at the Berlin conference of 1885 (Hentz, 2004). Hence, they are imported states which 
did not organically evolve from Africa’s reality but driven by the interests of European colonizers.  
During the Cold War, the two superpowers and their allies interfered in the affairs of African states, 
supporting factions with funding, military aid, troops perceived critical for the interests of the former at the 
expense of the latter.  The super-powers supported any client state that is strategically significant to meet the 
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interests of the big boys of the time. This situation hides the real undemocratic features of African states. 
However, when the cold war was over, and the big boys deny their support, African states' disclosed their actual 
behaviors (Hentz, 2004). After the war, African countries become “Cold War Orphans,” that are devoid of their 
internal capacity and super-power support (Ncube, and Basil 2013; Brooks, 2005).  
One of the external causes of state failure was the structural adjustment programs of international financial 
institutions in the 1980s and 1990s in Africa. After the Cold War, the World Bank and IMF initiated a whole 
series of interventions to promote good governance through structural adjustment, economic liberalization, and 
privatization that aimed at pushing back the predominance and power of state structures and pave the way for 
civil society engagement. The state capacity and state-building agenda were not given nearly as much thought or 
emphasis as the state downsizing agenda and pave the way for neo-patrimonial and predatory regimes in Africa 
(Fukuyama, 2005). In the absence of strong domestic demand, demand for institutions was generated externally 
by various conditions attached to the structural adjustment program, project lending external aid agencies, and 
the direct exercise of political power in failed, collapsed, or occupied states (Fukuyama, 2005).  
External actors consider state failure in Africa both as moral devastation and as a security peril.  In line with 
this, these actors have a dogmatic assumption and wishful thinking that all states shall follow a model of Western 
liberal democracy (Hagmann, and Markus, 2009). The Rostow modernization model intervention, where one fits 
for all and as if there are similar paths and ways to build/rebuild states in Africa. In terms of ideology, it is the 
same as the ideology of colonialism- the civilization mission. The external interventions fail to recognize the 
different principles and culture that politics and governance in many African countries operate (Moe, 2010). 
Besides, the interventions created gaps between declared objectives and de facto commitment and capacity, lack 
of local-level representation and ownership, and the re-enforcing alliance between the west bloodsuckers and 
African elite dictators. This alignment between the external actors and the political elites marginalized the 
governed and affected state-society relations in Africa (Moe, 2010). 
The State failure debate of the west did not take into thought the Atlantic slave trade, Colonial and neo- 
Colonial experiences of Africa that created permanent contradictions and crises in the continent (E. Akani, 2016). 
Endogamous factors such as civil war, ethnic identity, or authoritarian rule are given precedence over 
exogamous factors such as the international political economy, external interferences, and various transnational 
forces. Thereby, the implicit but wrong institutional breakdown of the African state resulted in a breakdown 
within African societies themselves (Hagmann, and Markus, 2009). Hence, both internal and external factors 
need to be considered to better unearth and understand the reality of state collapse in Africa. 
 
4. Impacts of Failed / Collapsed States 
State failure creates numerous challenges for humans, national, regional, and international peace, security, and 
governance. Problems associated with failing states like terrorism, civil wars, poverty, and violations of human 
rights threaten peace and security on both regional and global levels. Under contexts of state failure and collapse, 
it is difficult to ensure security, peace, and development that also present a challenge for global governance from 
different angles (Baker, 2007). Consequently, poverty, disease, violence, and refugee flows accompanying state 
failures strain humanitarian costs (Brooks, 2005).  
The domestic effects of state failure and collapse are severe challenges for the citizens’ day to day activities 
and life. State collapse is especially devastating, as the total disintegration of law and order creates anarchy and 
its resultant insecurity and gross violations of nationals’ liberty and rights. Generally, it shifts the attention from 
development to warmonger (Baker, 2007). When there is a gross violation of human rights and freedoms of 
nationals, the international community has a moral and legal responsibility to protect civilians under the doctrine 
of the "Responsibility to Protect," which was endorsed by the United Nations in New York in September 2005.  
State failure and collapse also have strong regional and neighborhood effects. The civil war that often 
accompanies state failure and collapse can easily spill over into neighboring countries through refugee and 
insurgent movement and support (Cojanu, and A. I., 2007). State failure has also negative effects on economic 
growth in bordering countries by creating additional investment for accommodating refugees, and to protect the 
spread of malaria and other diseases (Chauvet and Collier, 2005; Cojanu, and A. I., 2007). Some argue that states 
neighboring a failed state are also likely to experience subsequently higher levels of political instability, unrest, 
civil war, and interstate conflict. There is also a likelihood of state failure itself diffusing to other states (Iqbal, 
and Harvey 2008). 
At the global level, these states allow drug production and trafficking, international terrorism, the 
proliferation of crime: breeding grounds for extremism, save heaven for organized terrorist and criminal groups, 
flourishing violence, and illicit economic activity (Brooks, 2005). Failed states also pose legal challenges where 
societies cannot enter into or abide by treaties; cannot participate in the increasingly dense network of 
international trade, environmental, or human rights agreements and institutions; cannot enforce contracts 
between their citizens and foreigners or protect settled property interests (Brooks, 2005). 
So it is mandatory to understand the trans-boundary nature of the problem and work cooperatively across 
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levels (Cojanu, and A. I., 2007). As lawlessness spreads and corrupt non-state actors seize control over various 
parts of the country, failing states become ideal incubators for a variety of threats of international scope. The 
trafficking of women and children in the DRC, refugee flows from Sudan, the spread of AIDS and malaria 
throughout weak states in Africa, the illegal flow of conflict diamonds from countries such as Liberia and the 
Republic of Congo, and supporting militias and insurgencies in neighboring states are the critical challenges 
presented by failed states in Africa.  
Despite great differences in approach, the reports, analyses, experts, committees, and think-tanks seem to 
agree on one point: a solution to problems like international terrorism, failing states, civil wars, poverty, and 
human rights violations calls for an integrated approach to security. Its principle is that peace, security, political 
and economic development, and respect for human rights are inextricably linked. It is argued that economic 
breakdown and political instability are serious consequences arising from state failure and collapse than the 
security dangers posed to the external environment. In short, the negative domestic impacts are by far greater 
than its external impacts. 
 
5. The Debate on Responses to State Failure or Collapse 
Both internal and external pressures account for state reconstruction. Without carefully considering local 
situations thinking and doing state-building and other proposed solutions from outside does not work (Heilbrunn, 
2006). The majority of policies in international conferences largely reflect donors’ interests. As a result, local 
people tend to see state-building assistance as illegitimate and refuse to accept it. Although international actors 
have advocated the importance of ownership, grassroots representation, or participation in the decision-making 
process has generally become a ritual devoid of substance. Focusing only on political order may not make sense. 
Hence incorporating the social order is essential (Brooks, 2005; Yoo, 2011). To have a viable and functional 
state, liberal democracy, and liberal economic system requires better scrutiny of the ontology on the ground.  
In response to state failure, international, regional, and sub-regional actors and institutions, and states, have 
taken steps to address the immediate humanitarian and security problems through means that range from food 
aid to the deployment of peacekeeping forces (Brooks, 2005). The international community has sought to reverse 
state failure by fostering diverse political parties, strengthening constitutional and legal norms relating to good 
governance, building an independent and effective judiciary, reconstituting a professional military and police 
service, and holding free and fair elections (Brooks, 2005). 
However, the current international responses to failed states are often counterproductive. These measures 
are haphazard, fragmented, and short-term responses that sometimes exacerbate the problem instead of downing 
it. Some of the limitations of international responses to state failure are little understanding of the problem; 
insufficient awareness of the role of the international community; the solutions applied tend to be one size fits all; 
and there is no understanding of shared responsibility to use bottom-up and top-down approaches to solve the 
troubles (Ashraf and Clare, 2008). Global stability will lie in the creation of aware citizens who can see paths of 
state-building and participate, and trust in their institutions (Ashraf and Clare, 2008). The state failure responsive 
measures should take into account both domestic and external factors attributed to state collapse (Hentz, 2004).  
The global governance institutions, security organizations, and developmental institutions recognize that an 
effective state is a necessary condition for solving peace, security, governance, and development related 
problems. Generally, there is a consensus that only sovereign states that perform the functions that make them 
sovereign will allow human progress to continue (Ashraf and Clare, 2008).  
In the state-building processes, it is critical to devise ways to empower and participate citizens in every 
decision-making as a continuous process of deepening and broadening the rights and obligations of citizenship 
(Ashraf and Clare, 2008). The development of institutions through the creation of governance capacities is 
among the mechanisms of sovereign rehabilitations (Fukuyama, 2005). State-building is about the external 
attempt to build or reinforce institutions (Zartman, 1995). Contrary to the concept of state formation, which is 
mainly an endogenously driven mechanism, state-building encompasses a variety of exogenous strategies (e.g., 
military occupation, peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid) aimed to develop governance. The state-
building is a dynamic, citizen-oriented mechanism that is necessary for the constitution of a legitimate economic, 
social, and political order (Ashraf and Clare, 2008).  As long as the problem of African statehood is a capacity-
problem, there will be no suitable solution to resolve the statehood crisis than handling the capacity crisis. 
Because international peace and security depend on the existence of independent states capable of controlling 
their territories, policing their populations, and discharging their international obligations (Yoo, 2011). Hence, 
addressing both capacity and autonomy is essential. 
Contrary to the arguments against external interventions in the name of addressing state failure, there are 
recommendations to encourage interventions by removing obstacles found in international law and policy (Yoo, 
2011). According to Yoo(2011), though there is a lack of direct benefit to the intervening state, intervention does 
not discard state sovereignty, but it may require accepting adjustments to the borders of failed states. 
International law, therefore, should encourage, rather than discourage, intervention. International law could 
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further advance this process by allowing for different forms of governance within territories and by permitting 
the alteration of pre-existing borders (Yoo, 2011). Since 1991, various efforts have been made to restore state 
failure, but the international interventions failed to pacify and reinforce or create an institution of government.  
 
6. Comparative Assessment of Cases in Africa  
In a period of about 80 years of colonial rule, Africa was divided into a number of artificial states with sole 
preferences and whims of the colonialists and little regard for the desires of the inhabitants of Africa (Thomson, 
2010). African states all share a post-colonial status. Stemming from this shared post-colonial history is the 
‘artificial nature’ of Africa’s state borders and the notion that statehood was imposed on African societies 
(Solomon, and Cornelia, 2004). A pattern of centralization and monopolization of power by new ruling elites is 
also characteristic of African states inherited from colonial administrations.  African states are tormented by a 
pervasive external context and continuous dependency.  Consequently, Africa is the least developed continent in 
the world that suffers from the highest levels of human insecurity, deprivation, and poverty (Ibid.2004). 
The problem is very serious in Africa. African states have occupied a prominent place in the discussion 
about state failure, collapse, and reconstruction. Consequently, they are perceived to be threatened by ‘collapse’, 
‘failure’, ‘fragility’, and ‘weakness’ as they degenerate into nightmarish ‘shadow’, ‘quasi’ or ‘warlord’ states 
(Hagmann, and Markus, 2009). Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan are 
failed states and Somalia is a collapsed state in Africa (Rotberg, 2004). Moreover, it is because of external 
recognition that many of Africa’s weak states continued to exist (Eriksen, 2011). The sources of disorder in 
Africa are varied and include colonial legacy, the Cold War, and state failure (Bates, 2005). 
 
6.1.   State Fragility in Burundi  
State fragility in Burundi has been both a cause and consequence of political instability (Nkurunziza, 2018). The 
root cause of state fragility traced back to the divide and rule policies of colonialism that were inherited by post-
colonial elites. Therefore, state fragility in Burundi is first and foremost the result of the strategies and policies of 
its colonial masters and corrupted political leaders, who are motivated by personal interests (Ibid). State fragility 
in Burundi displays all five dimensions that generally characterize fragility: groups came to power through coups 
d’états or constitutional fraud, lack of effective steering a development process, neglected and underdeveloped 
private sector, insecurity and civil wars, and vulnerable to political and economic shocks(Ibid).  
Burundi has a long history of violence and oppression, much of it linked to the politicization of ethnicity. 
The context resulted in over a decade of civil war between 1993 and 2003 that involved multiple armed groups 
organized along with Hutu versus Tutsi lines (Wilén, & Paul D., 2018). At the same time, post-colonial Burundi 
had a long tradition of strong resistance to foreign involvement in its domestic sphere that made external 
interventions a difficult task to manage the conflict. Moreover, international efforts to resolve the ongoing ethnic 
strife have been challenged by leaders’ zeal to stay in power, coup attempts, and mistrusts among various 
fractions. However, there were interventions from its neighbours, AU (AMIB 2003), USA, UK, and UN 
(operation in Burundi 2004) to handle the problem (Ibid.2018). 
It is one of the poorest countries in the world and lags behind many human development indicators. In 
addition to being poor, Burundi is highly vulnerable to shocks. Since independence, it is in a multidimensional 
fragility trap that has considerably limited its economic development and progress that improve the living 
standards of the population. The most well-known aspect of this fragility is the high degree of political instability 
and violence that are endemic to the country. Political fragility has hampered efforts to strengthen economic 
resilience by preventing the development of a modern private sector and perpetuating reliance on foreign aid. 
More recently, years of political and economic fragility, combined with a growing population leading to a third 
important aspect of fragility: environmental fragility. 
The mix of persisting political instability, growing factional violence, and the deteriorating macroeconomic 
situation has hit the living standards of the population hard. In post-independent Burundi, political volatility in 
leadership, ethnic violence, ethnic polarization, and the violation of ethnic minority rights are features of its 
politics. Since the early days of independence, Burundians have mainly accessed and controlled political power 
through violence. Since independence, the country has changed leadership 11 times—six of these through 
military coups. 
Underpinning Burundi’s political fragility is weak governance and institutions. The incomplete process of 
building their capacity is among the elements of its fragility trap. Decades of civil war have considerably limited 
the extent to which civilian institutions developed. The prevalent of patronage and less emphasis on the need for 
meritocratic criteria undermine civil institution building in it. In turn, poor governance negatively affects the 
ability of the state to provide security for citizens, deliver social services, manage public investments, or 
encourage agricultural and other private sector growth. Corruption, abuses of the judicial system, lack of security 
and access to the judicial system, and criminality are all main challenges of the country. According to 
international indicators, Burundi is one of the countries with the worst governance records in the world as of 
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Colonial legacies, the post-independence assassination of the freely elected president, ethnic polarization, 
and sparking waves of revenge ethnic violence undermined democratic governance in Burundi. However, in the 
pre-colonial period, such ethnic hostility and loyalty were not pronounced, where the king was serving regardless 
of ethnic and clan-based lineages. 
The instability in Burundi can be seen from various historical origins or angles. The first is the colonial 
administration that weakened the pre-colonial governance and created a sense of rivalry among social groups by 
introducing divide and rule policies. Before colonialism, it was a very strong, centralized, and stable state in the 
sub-region, with power controlled by a secular monarchy whose authority was generally uncontested throughout 
the country (Nkurunziza, 2018). The colonial masters undermined the traditional system of governance by 
introducing “divide and conquer” policies that broke the secular identity of the people of Burundi and introduced 
ethnic balkanization that weakened the traditional state structure in it.  
While the Belgian colonial authority is attributed to the creation of state fragility in Burundi, Burundian 
political elites, particularly those within the Tutsi group who ruled the country for most of the post-colonial 
period, perpetuated it through their leadership (Ibid. 2018). The military dictatorship is the dominant part of post-
colonial Burundi’s history. In addition to colonialism, the role of political elites, political volatility, the weakness 
of both AU and UN peacekeeping operations are crucial to understanding the fragile nature of the state. 
According to the Fund for Peace (2019) annual report, Burundi is the fifteenth with a 98.2 score. 
 
6.2.   State Failure in Democratic Republic of Congo  
Before colonialism, there was no political entity with the boundaries of the modern state of Zaire (1960- 1997) 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1997. Several different ethnic groups lived within the area 
today comprise the DRC (Gourou, 2000). These groups lived in small kingdoms and republics that had protected 
their citizens for centuries (Davidson, 1992). 
After getting its independence in 1960, in the early 1970s DRC was emerging as a relatively strong 
authoritarian one-party state with centralized power of the “arch-dictator” (Townshend, 2007). Mobutu 
developed a patrimonial regime that used the military to control both the country’s mineral wealth and to control 
the separatist pressures. He also used the classic divide and rule techniques among various ethnic groups during 
his time (Hentz, 2004). As rich as Zaire was in mineral resources, Mobutu depended on external assistance, in 
particular from the U.S., to maintain his patronage network.  
The end of the Cold War was the beginning of his demise where the level of bilateral aid declined, and the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank were no longer as willing to engage in the debt relief with Mobutu 
(Hentz, 2004). In the post-cold-war era, the DRC lost its strategic significance to the West owing to the later 
shift to a greater interest in human rights. As both the armed forces and the state depended on foreign aid for 
survival, these dramatic reductions signaled the final stages towards failure. Also, regional insecurity fuelled by 
providing refuge and support to insurgent groups in neighboring Angola and Uganda pushed the latter to act to 
remove leaders from power. In this way, both global and regional systemic pressures converged to facilitate the 
sub-state accumulation of coercive power (Hentz, 2004). 
DRC experienced various military coups, civil wars, assassinations, erosion of legitimacy, internal 
displacement of people, social problems, poverty, foreign intervention (Hentz, 2004). Highly-personalized, neo-
patrimonial, corrupted, and centralized authoritarian rule which seeks to monopolize political control by 
establishing various networks with unlimited embezzlement for personal gain (Rotberg, 2004). Furthermore, the 
economic downturn in the global economy, foreign debt problem, private predation, mismanagement, and 
escalating inflations were also challenges that exacerbate state failure (Ibid).  
When all the relevant data is analyzed, the Democratic Republic of Congo is a failed state (Cem, 2009). 
Firstly, the country is unable to exercise sovereign control over its borders, and secondly, it cannot provide the 
services of protection of the lives, rights, and property of its citizens (Ibid). Furthermore, it has no political 
stability, and the state cannot exercise its sovereignty fully over its borders, the ruling regime again cannot 
provide health services, and the country is unable or unwilling to control child trafficking. In DRC patrimonial 
and predatory rule depends on a patronage-based system of extraction from ordinary citizens (Fukuyama, 2005; 
Rotberg, 2004). The people of the D.R.C. denied the opportunity to choose or change their government through 
democratic and peaceful means. Hence, they do not have a recognizable government with legitimate authority 
sanctioned by the population of the state (Solomon, and Cornelia, 2004).  
Since independence, the government of D.R.C is both undemocratic and weak in terms of its authority and 
influence (Ibid.2004). Since then, the country is characterized by cross-border raids, the interference of 
neighbouring states in its domestic affairs, and serious human rights abuses (Solomon, and Cornelia, 2004). 
Judging from the discussion of the nature and performance of the state, it is apparent that DRC does not qualify 
as a functional state, especially in its record for political freedom and civil liberty, as well as its provision of 
political and social goods. Despite being seriously impaired in certain realms of statehood, this state has not 
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reached the point of complete collapse and can thus not classified as a collapsed state (Ibid. 2004). 
The wars in the DRC have multiple causes revolving around four clusters of factors: economic factors, 
institutional factors, regional factors, and global geopolitical factors. These factors are interrelated and cannot be 
treated in isolation in understanding the causes of the conflicts or in the design of strategies for overcoming 
conflicts and for post-conflict economic development. The overall weak state of the economy played a key role 
in the genesis of the conflicts (United Nations, 2015). 
Institutions have played a critical role in the genesis and perpetuation of conflicts in the DRC. The 
institutions established under the colonial regime and in the post-independ-ence era generated and perpetuated 
antagonisms around the control of the state and national resources while sowing the seeds for inter-regional and 
inter-ethnic conflicts. The disputes around the configuration of the federalism vs. centralized – which 
characterized the political discourse during the struggle for independence and in the post-independence era 
remain a subject of contention even in today’s politics in the DRC (United Nations, 2015). 
The adoption of political pluralism and the holding of democratic elections, in particular, the 2006 elections 
brought fresh air into the institutional process and revived hopes for the legitimacy of state institutions and the 
central government. However, political liberalization needs to be further consolidated, especially in the areas of 
transparency and equitable representa-tion of all regions and segments of the population (United Nations, 2015). 
The global environment remains a factor in the country’s prospects for conflict resolution and long-run 
economic growth and development. In the post-cold war era, although strategic imperatives have changed, the 
DRC remains strategically significant in the global fight against terrorism. It is also the epicentre of the scramble 
for natural resources driven by the ever-rising demand for energy and industrial raw material. In this con-text, 
the stability and consolidation of the state’s control over the territory have critical role dimensions. Hence the 
urgency for concerted efforts at regional and international levels to support the Congolese government and 
people to find solutions to the conflicts and move to a path of strong sustained and shared economic growth 
(United Nations, 2015). Why the European Union, USA interfere in DRC. According to the Fund for Peace 
(2019) annual report, DRC is the fifth with 110.2 score which indicates the high level of failure in the list. 
 
6.3.   Somalia as Collapsed State 
Before the colonial partition of Somali territories, there was no permanent centralized authority but a variety of 
local administrations and occasional centralized rules (Khayre, 2017). In 1956 Italian Somalia land and 1960 
British Somalia land conducted the first democratic election where the Somali Youth League (SYL) and the 
Somali National League (SNL) won the overwhelming majority of seats in the assembly of each unit 
respectively. After the independence and unification of two Somalia lands, Somalia enjoyed nine years of 
parliamentary democracy, arguably producing the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Africa (Khayre, 
2017).  The first Somali constitution of 1960, functional till 1969, safeguarded most of the human rights 
enshrined in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and provided multiparty election. Furthermore, 
there was a functioning independent judiciary and a unitary state structure. Additionally, political violence was 
non-existent during civilian rule. 
However, the civilian rule was dominated by rampant corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement in the later 
years of the civilian government. Furthermore, post-independence civilian governments were inefficient and 
incapable of creating a comprehensive national political culture (Rotberg, 2004).  The military overthrew the 
civilian government by assassinating the elected civilian president in a bloodless coup in 1969. But the junta did 
not wait long to repeat these social and political evils upon Somalis. Backed by foreign intervention, Siad Barre 
destroyed institutions of government and democracy, abused human rights, committed corruption in terms of 
favouritism and embezzlement for himself and his sub-clan where all of the major clans and sub-clans became 
alienated (Rotberg, 2004).  Instead of winning the battle of ideas, the military tried to use might where populism 
shifted to militarism and politicization and militarization of clan politics (Khayre, 2017), and the military regime 
was removed from power in 1991 via a coup. 
Since 1991, Somalia has been the only United Nations member country without an effective government-
collapsed state. Consequently, civil war, terrorism, lawlessness, and piracy plague the country that is in perpetual 
turmoil (Khayre, 2017). Since then, because of the colonial legacies of dived and rule policies, hostile clan 
politics, and other external impacts, Somalia is a stateless society. According to the Fund for Peace (2019) 
annual report, Somalia is the second with a 112.3 score, just the second next to Yemen in the top list of state 
collapse. 
Somalia not only represents the most protracted case of state collapse but also has witnessed the emergence 
of multiple local governance systems, both formal and informal, which rarely acknowledged in the state failure 
debate. Furthermore, the de facto existence of a ‘greater Somalia based on a shared cultural identity, religion, 
cross-border kinship relations, and regional trade, transport, and finance networks, allows drawing comparisons 
between comparable sub-national political orders within Somalia (Hagmann, and Markus, 2009).  In contrast to 
state collapse, Somalia demonstrates that a population can survive by creating informal systems of adaptation, 
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security, and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government’ (Hagmann, and Markus, 
2009).  
The clan is the building blocks of security, party formation, office appointments, governance systems, and 
power-sharing modalities in Somalia. A multitude of clan-based “warlords” and Somalia’s leadership deficit as 
negative factors for the rebuilding process. Furthermore, a wide range of domestic actors who profited from 
continued state collapse and conferences work against efforts of state-building are pitfalls for it.  Moreover, the 
prioritization of clan legitimacy and loyalty over state legitimacy and widespread public mistrust of the central 
government are also challenges for the state rebuilding process (Khayre, 2017). Despite many conferences were 
organized with the help and assistance of neighboring countries, regional organizations, and the United Nations; 
warlords, and clan leaders are reluctant to reach an agreement (Khayre, 2017). 
During the Cold War, superpowers continuously courted Somalia to come into, or stay within, their sphere 
of influence due to its strategic geographic location. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, its importance 
diminished, and the superpowers abandoned it to its device (Richburg, 1992). Because of the end of the Cold 
War and the outbreak of the first Gulf War, no significant external mediation efforts made to address Somalia’s 
deepening crisis. In fact, for the last 24 years, more than sixteen peace and reconciliation conferences have been 
held, but none have been successful (Khayre, 2017). 
The United Nations interfere in Somalia to ameliorate the situation by urging warring parties to create a 
conducive environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. Furthermore, in January 1992 the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 733 to establish the first UN peacekeeping operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM I) with a mandate to maintain a ceasefire, promote reconciliation, and a political settlement, 
and provide urgent humanitarian assistance. With this apparent diplomatic breakthrough, the UNSC endorsed a 
new Resolution (814) to expand the UN’s role in Somalia, deploying some 28,000 peacekeepers and giving 
UNOSOM II a mandate to restore peace, law, and order and help re-establish a national government. 
However, lack of transparency and impartiality, disagreement on the selection of participants, and mistrust 
affect the mission negatively. A perceived bias of the United Nations and the United States antagonized clan 
warlords, and disputes soon emerged over the different interpretations of agreements reached.  Military and 
diplomatic interventions of both the USA and UNOSOM withdrew and failed to achieve reconciliation and 
revive state collapse in Somalia. 
In 2000 the Djibouti government hosted the Somalia National Peace Conference in the town of Arta. The 
‘Arta process achieved an important political breakthrough by producing a power-sharing agreement, bottom-up 
approach, and established a Transitional National Government (TNG) with its charter. In the conference, except 
representatives from Somalia land and Put land, various clan elders, civic leaders, business people, and 
international community representatives were participating and adopted a unitary, rather than federal, state in 
Somalia(Malito, 2011). It also endorsed Somali state-building on a 4.5 power-sharing formula, where four big 
clans get an equal share of the members of parliament, and any representation and a coalition of all other 
‘minority clans’ is considered to be half a clan and get their share accordingly.  
TNG was supported by Egypt, Libya, Eritrea, the Gulf States, and the UN but failed to win the backing of 
Somalia's land, Put-land, and neighboring states (Malito, 2011). As a counter in 2001, those opposed to this plan 
formed a coalition against the TNG called the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), 
supported by Ethiopia and United States (Malito, 2011). This further highlighted how the interests of regional 
powers had become a hindrance to reconciliation in Somalia.  
This led to in 2004, IGAD organized a conference to bring the Djibouti-backed TNG and its Ethiopian-
backed opponents the SRRC into a comprehensive political settlement held in Kenya- Mbgathi Peace 
Conference. It resulted in the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter and a Transitional Federal Parliament 
and concluded by electing a president in October 2004 for a five-year transitional period. In direct opposition to 
the Arta process of 2000 unitary state structure, the 2004 Mbgathi process proposed a federal state structure. 
Since 2000, diplomatic antagonism during peace talks has undermined Somalia’s reconciliation process (Malito, 
2011). Alternative diplomatic initiatives, based on rival state-building approaches, were attempting to orient 
Somalia’s reconstruction on different policy trajectories: Ethiopia and Western actors encouraged a decentralized 
approach while competing for Arab initiatives (sponsored by Egypt, Eritrea, and the Arab League) supported a 
centralized approach (Malito, 2011). 
Most external actors have approached the Somali crisis from the perspective of their national security and 
strategic interests (Malito, 2011; Hagmann, and Markus, 2009). Any intervening foreign power, therefore, brings 
with its national interests and political value system and could limit the success. Furthermore, external 
interventions have been uncommitted, partisan, uncoordinated, misinformed, and incompetent in their mediation 
efforts (Khayre, 2017).  
The only successful responses to this problem of sovereignty have emerged from local projects of sub-
national state-building.  For instance, the self-proclamation of the independent Republic of Somaliland in 1991, 
and the declaration of Punt-land as an autonomous region in 1998 are manifestations of sub-national state-
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building projects in Somalia. In the end, the domestic actors are unable to get a solution for their burden, and 
similarly, the multilateral military and humanitarian interventions led by different actors failed to restore peace 
and stability at best or exacerbated the situation at worst mainly because of their intrinsic top-down nature, 
realist and capacity oriented approaches (Malito, 2011).  The failure of a decade of reconciliation and state-
building efforts in Somalia is an interest-driven crisis (Menkhaus, 2003). 
 
7. Lesson from the Three Comparative Analysis  
The selected cases (Burundi, the DRC, and Somalia) are characterized by insurgencies, anarchy, warlords’ 
competitions, instabilities, underdevelopment, and external interventions in the form of imperialism and neo-
colonialism. Africans have been challenged by historic and economic factors, more than states on other 
continents. This has been exacerbated by imperialism and ‘neo-colonialism’. Hence, there is no denying that 
external actors like governments, international organizations, and transnational companies have played a major 
part in Africa’s current situations (Thomson, 2010). 
The conflicts in the DRC, Burundi, and Somalia have been costly in various ways for the neighboring 
countries, the sub-region, and the continent as a whole. The wars have prevented them and their neighbors from 
taking advantage of cross-border trade opportunities. They have compromised regional infrastructure 
development, especially in the power and transport sector, thus undermining growth and regional integration. 
The wars have also corroded the envi-ronment for cooperation in the region that retard the implementation of 
mutually beneficial regional integration programs. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks  
Failing, Failed, and collapsed states are among the debates in the academic circles and living realities 
characterized by economic breakdown, insecurity, and unfit government to effectively control their territory and 
comply with their international obligations and resulted in problems without passports. Why should we focus on 
these states? There are two reasons. First, as failed states have accumulated and persisted, they have generated or 
intensified a significant part of the global governance, security, peace operation, and humanitarian problems that 
is the international communities' core mission to confront. In this regard, failed states have adverse negative 
effects on themselves and their people in terms of economic breakdown, insecurity, and unfit government and 
have impacts on neighbors, region, and global levels in terms of security, peace, and governance challenges. 
Second, rebuilding a failed state and preventing sates from failure through both curative and preventive 
interventions is a moral and legal responsibility of the global governance institutions to protect from these ills. 
Hence, such countries must be brought into the mainstream agenda of global governance, peace, and security for 
humanity seek. 
The above cases showed that state capacity and functionality problems in Africa are the results of both 
internal and external factors. Among the external interventions is colonial administration that left with weak 
institutions, artificial boundary, authoritarian rule, the balkanization of groups, and eroding state sovereignty and 
legitimacy. The other external factor was the cold war military, ideological, and strategic rivalry where Africa 
was a battlefield. The structural adjustment program of the Bretton Wood Institutions has also hurt the viability 
of African states by forcing them to downsize their capacity in the name of privatization and a free market 
economy. Presently the securitization of failed states by the big boys may also undermine the capacity and 
independence of African states to do their day to day business. 
Though the external interventions have a far significant impact on the African state's capacity and 
functionality, domestic factors also have a contribution to the wide prevalence of state fragility, failure, and 
collapse in Africa. Most significantly neo-patrimonial, authoritarian, and corrupt rulers take the lion share of the 
problem. Furthermore, parochial political culture, a weak economy, weak civil societies, socio-political 
fragmentation, and poor education have contributed to the ills of the continent. 
Finding solutions to the existential problems of the selected cases requires addressing the root causes of the 
problem not only to bring an end to existing functionality problems but also to prevent new cycles of fragility. 
The focus should be on building strong public institutions and designing and implementing a peace building 
agenda, rebuilding the economy, reforming the security sector, strengthening regional integration, and take 
positive lessons from external interventions. 
Having a functional and strong state is imperative for the realization of development, peace, law, and order, 
and the prevention of further violence at national, sub-regional, and continental levels. Addressing the gap on 
where to focus is critical: what is there or what ought to be there. The gap between external rhetoric and 
empirical realities is widening that demands critically rethinking approaches to peace and state-building. There is 
a contradiction between the state-building mechanisms of the west and the power elites of Africa. The elites 
were concerned with regime survival, while the west for the survival of their national interests(Moe, 2010).   
Addressing the path gap is also critical. External actors engaged in peace, security, and governance and 
state-building need to pay greater attention to actual conditions for institutionalizing sustainable political and 
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social order. An increasing focus on harmonizing state-society relations that includes non-state actors and 
institutions which are currently left outside the rebuilding narratives has to be invited in these processes. 
Rebuilding state institutions can only be successful if it is supported by the populations of the territory who have 
a deep interest in their formation, strengthening, and perpetuation (Khayre, 2017). Moreover, the best way to 
ensure people’s faith in the state and its institutions is to base the institutions on human security, harmonization, 
and rule of law. Unless and until state-building takes root in the indigenous society and with committed local 
leadership, no amount of external support will make it fix (Usman and Hany, 2007). 
The solutions for state failures have to be a multilayer. Since the end of the cold war, a variety of 
international responses have been attempted and proposed by the international community to address problems. 
Among the trials, intervention in the name of humanitarian, neo-liberalism, securitization, state-building, and 
peacekeeping operations are the main ones. The ongoing nature of the phenomenon of state failure and security 
threats for the 21st century demanded to focus on state-building, the creation of new government institutions, 
and the strengthening of existing ones, by the world community (Fukuyama, 2005). 
Making securitization efforts altruistic is critical. The securitization of failed states in political and academic 
discourse, and the attention given to these situations in policy circles, also reflects a subjective construction of 
international security threats. Less positively, the securitization of weak and failed states reinforces a tendency to 
externalize problems in the developing countries, and even to demonize the ‘other’ as a pretext for control and 
intervention (Newman, 2009).   Furthermore, instead of prioritizing the securitization of the west security 
interest alone, it is better to see it from the potentials and interests of these states as well.  
The researcher believes that if humanitarian intervention, peace operations, securitization, and liberal peace 
are done from the goodwill of deontology, the problems and challenges of fragile, failed, and collapsed sates will 
be addressed. Consequently, this in turn will bring positive spill over impacts for all stakeholders. 
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